founders like Elon Musk or Mark Zuckerberg to control their public companies without owning most of them are nothing new in Silicon Valley. But Anthropic’s obsession with AI safety has resulted in a truly baroque style of corporate governance that will leave common shareholders with little say over most major decisions at the AI company, including who sits on its board.
First, Anthropic is a public benefit company—a for-profit corporation legally allowed to weigh a public mission alongside profit—with the goal of promoting AI safety. That status protects the board’s ability to make decisions about AI safety that aren’t driven entirely by shareholder value without being sued by angry investors.
Right now, the board is chaired by Anthropic president Daniela Amodei and includes CEO Dario Amodei (her brother), Netflix cofounder Reed Hastings, former Microsoft and GM CFO Christopher Liddell, Novartis CEO Vas Narasimhan, and Spark Capital partner Yasmin Razavi. There is one vacancy on the board.
Second, Anthropic has allocated significant control of its board to a Long Term Benefit Trust (LTBT), an independent panel meant to keep the company focused on mission to benefit humanity. The trust owns a class of stock that gives it the ability to elect and remove a majority of the company’s board, known as Class T directors. The LTBT is chaired by Neil Shah, a global health expert who was managing director at GiveWell, a nonprofit that ranks charities, and includes former Federal Reserve chair Ben Bernanke, The dynamics of such a complex structure are hard to predict. We’ve already seen one notable instance where a similar structure was essentially overthrown: OpenAI’s so-called blip, when OpenAI’s board briefly fired CEO Sam Altman over concerns that he was not being candid with them. Thanks to the loyalty of the company’s employees to Altman, the board backed down, reinstated him, and a new governance structure was put in place. Anthropic’s structure seems to formalize that kind of employee power. At Anthropic, cracks in the founders’ unified front could lead to common shareholders having more say than expected, while employees can overrule the LTBT on board seats if they back the board over the assembled luminaries. The founders’ control won’t last forever: Ten years after the IPO, the founders can choose to end their control of the company, or their control will end automatically when fewer than three of them remain. At that point, the LTBT will continue until 85% of common shareholders vote to end it, or it decides to step down with approval from the board. If and when neither special class of shareholder exists any more—hopefully not because of an AI-driven catastrophe—common shareholders finally get control.
